in what sense are animals members of a moral community according to r.g. frey

Belief that animals have interests that should be considered

Parshwanatha, the 23rd Tirthankara, revived Jainism and ahimsa in the 9th century BCE, which led to a radical animal-rights movement in South Asia.^[1]

Animal rights is the philosophy according to which many or all sentient animals take moral worth that is contained of their utility for humans, and that their almost basic interests—such as in fugitive suffering—should exist afforded the same consideration every bit similar interests of man beings.^[2] Broadly speaking, and specially in popular soapbox, the term "animal rights" is often used synonymously with "animal protection" or "fauna liberation". More narrowly, "animal rights" refers to the thought that many animals have key rights to be treated with respect as individuals—rights to life, liberty, and freedom from torture that may not be overridden by considerations of aggregate welfare.^[3]

Advocates for creature rights oppose the assignment of moral value and central protections on the basis of species membership solitary—an idea known equally speciesism since 1970, when Richard D. Ryder adopted the term^[4]—arguing that it is a prejudice equally irrational as any other.^[5] They maintain that animals should no longer be viewed as property or used equally food, clothing, research subjects, amusement, or beasts of burden.^[half-dozen] Multiple cultural traditions around the globe such as Jainism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism and Animism also espouse some forms of animal rights.

In parallel to the argue about moral rights, law schools in Northward America now frequently teach fauna law,^[7] and several legal scholars, such equally Steven M. Wise and Gary L. Francione, back up the extension of basic legal rights and personhood to non-human animals. The animals most often considered in arguments for personhood are hominids. Some animate being-rights academics support this considering it would break through the species barrier, but others oppose it because it predicates moral value on mental complexity, rather than on sentience lonely.^[eight] As of November 2019^[update], 29 countries had enacted bans on hominoid experimentation; Argentina has granted a captive orangutan basic man rights since 2014.^[ix]

Outside the order of primates, animal-rights discussions nearly often address the condition of mammals (compare charismatic megafauna). Other animals (considered less sentient) accept gained less attending; insects relatively little^[10] (outside Jainism), and animal-similar bacteria (despite their overwhelming numbers) hardly whatsoever.^[11]

Critics of animal rights argue that nonhuman animals are unable to enter into a social contract, and thus cannot exist possessors of rights, a view summed upwardly by the philosopher Roger Scruton (1944–2020), who writes that merely humans have duties, and therefore just humans have rights.^[12] Some other statement, associated with the utilitarian tradition, maintains that animals may be used every bit resources then long as there is no unnecessary suffering;^[13] animals may have some moral continuing, but they are junior in condition to homo beings, and any interests they accept may be overridden, though what counts as "necessary" suffering or a legitimate cede of interests can vary considerably.^[14] Certain forms of brute-rights activism, such as the devastation of fur farms and of animate being laboratories by the Animal Liberation Front end, have attracted criticism, including from within the animal-rights movement itself,^[xv] and have prompted reaction from the U.S. Congress with the enactment of laws, including the Creature Enterprise Terrorism Human action, allowing the prosecution of this sort of activeness every bit terrorism.^[16]

History [edit]

In religion [edit]

For some the basis of animal rights is in organized religion or beast worship (or in general nature worship), with some religions banning killing of any animal, and in other religions animals tin can be considered unclean.

Hindu and Buddhist societies abandoned animal sacrifice and embraced vegetarianism from the 3rd century BCE.^[17] One of the most important sanctions of the Jain, Hindu and Buddhist faiths is the concept of ahimsa, or refraining from the devastation of life. According to Buddhist belief, humans do not deserve preferential treatment over other living beings.^[eighteen] The Dharmic interpretation of this doctrine prohibits the killing of any living being.^[18]

In Islam, animal rights were recognized early on past the Sharia. This recognition is based on both the Qur'an and the Hadith. In the Qur'an, at that place are many references to animals, detailing that they have souls, form communities, communicate with God and worship Him in their own manner. Muhammad forbade his followers to harm any animate being and asked them to respect the rights of animals.^[19]

According to Christianity, all animals, from the smallest to the largest, are cared for and loved. Co-ordinate to the Bible, "All these animals waited for the Lord, that the Lord might give them food at the hour. The Lord gives them, they receive; The Lord opens his hand, and they are filled with good things".^[twenty] It further says God "gave food to the animals, and made the crows cry."^[21]

Philosophical and legal approaches [edit]

Overview [edit]

The two main philosophical approaches to fauna ethics are utilitarian and rights-based. The former is exemplified by Peter Singer, and the latter by Tom Regan and Gary Francione. Their differences reflect a distinction philosophers draw betwixt upstanding theories that gauge the rightness of an human action by its consequences (consequentialism/teleological ethics, or utilitarianism), and those that focus on the principle backside the act, almost regardless of consequences (deontological ethics). Deontologists argue that there are acts nosotros should never perform, even if failing to do so entails a worse upshot.^[22]

There are a number of positions that tin can be defended from a consequentalist or deontologist perspective, including the capabilities approach, represented past Martha Nussbaum, and the egalitarian approach, which has been examined by Ingmar Persson and Peter Vallentyne. The capabilities approach focuses on what individuals require to fulfill their capabilities: Nussbaum (2006) argues that animals need a right to life, some control over their surroundings, visitor, play, and physical health.^[23]

Stephen R. 50. Clark, Mary Midgley, and Bernard Rollin also talk over creature rights in terms of animals existence permitted to lead a life appropriate for their kind.^[24] Egalitarianism favors an equal distribution of happiness amongst all individuals, which makes the interests of the worse off more than of import than those of the improve off.^[25] Another arroyo, virtue ideals, holds that in considering how to act we should consider the character of the thespian, and what kind of moral agents nosotros should be. Rosalind Hursthouse has suggested an approach to animate being rights based on virtue ethics.^[26] Marker Rowlands has proposed a contractarian arroyo.^[27]

Utilitarianism [edit]

Nussbaum (2004) writes that utilitarianism, starting with Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, has contributed more than to the recognition of the moral condition of animals than any other ethical theory.^[28] The commonsensical philosopher virtually associated with animate being rights is Peter Singer, professor of bioethics at Princeton Academy. Vocalist is not a rights theorist, but uses the language of rights to discuss how we ought to treat individuals. He is a preference utilitarian, meaning that he judges the rightness of an act by the extent to which it satisfies the preferences (interests) of those affected.^[29]

His position is that in that location is no reason non to requite equal consideration to the interests of human and nonhumans, though his principle of equality does not require identical treatment. A mouse and a man both take an interest in non being kicked, and there are no moral or logical grounds for failing to accord those interests equal weight. Interests are predicated on the ability to endure, nada more, and once it is established that a existence has interests, those interests must be given equal consideration.^[30] Singer quotes the English philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900): "The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the betoken of view ... of the Universe, than the good of any other."^[31]

Peter Vocaliser: interests are predicated on the ability to suffer.

Singer argues that equality of consideration is a prescription, non an assertion of fact: if the equality of the sexes were based just on the thought that men and women were equally intelligent, we would have to abandon the practice of equal consideration if this were subsequently constitute to be false. Merely the moral idea of equality does not depend on matters of fact such equally intelligence, physical strength, or moral capacity. Equality therefore cannot be grounded on the outcome of scientific investigations into the intelligence of nonhumans. All that matters is whether they can suffer.^[32]

Commentators on all sides of the debate now accept that animals suffer and feel pain, although it was non ever then. Bernard Rollin, professor of philosophy, animal sciences, and biomedical sciences at Colorado State University, writes that Descartes' influence continued to be felt until the 1980s. Veterinarians trained in the Usa before 1989 were taught to ignore pain, he writes, and at least 1 major veterinary hospital in the 1960s did not stock narcotic analgesics for animal pain control. In his interactions with scientists, he was often asked to "testify" that animals are conscious, and to provide "scientifically acceptable" evidence that they could feel pain.^[33]

Scientific publications accept made it clear since the 1980s that the majority of researchers do believe animals suffer and feel pain, though information technology continues to be argued that their suffering may exist reduced by an inability to experience the same dread of anticipation as humans, or to remember the suffering equally vividly.^[34] The problem of animal suffering, and creature consciousness in general, arose primarily because it was argued that animals have no language. Vocalist writes that, if language were needed to communicate hurting, it would ofttimes be impossible to know when humans are in pain, though nosotros can observe pain behavior and make a calculated guess based on it. He argues that there is no reason to suppose that the hurting behavior of nonhumans would have a different meaning from the pain behavior of humans.^[35]

Subjects-of-a-life [edit]

Tom Regan, professor emeritus of philosophy at Northward Carolina State University, argues in The Case for Animal Rights (1983) that nonhuman animals are what he calls "subjects-of-a-life", and as such are bearers of rights.^[36] He writes that, considering the moral rights of humans are based on their possession of certain cognitive abilities, and considering these abilities are also possessed by at least some nonhuman animals, such animals must have the same moral rights equally humans. Although simply humans act as moral agents, both marginal-instance humans, such every bit infants, and at to the lowest degree some nonhumans must take the status of "moral patients".^[36]

Moral patients are unable to formulate moral principles, and as such are unable to exercise right or wrong, fifty-fifty though what they do may be benign or harmful. Only moral agents are able to engage in moral action. Animals for Regan accept "intrinsic value" as subjects-of-a-life, and cannot exist regarded as a ways to an end, a view that places him firmly in the abolitionist camp. His theory does non extend to all animals, only only to those that tin can be regarded as subjects-of-a-life.^[36] He argues that all normal mammals of at least one yr of age would qualify:

... individuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have behavior and desires; perception, retentivity, and a sense of the future, including their own futurity; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and hurting; preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their being the object of anyone else's interests.^[36]

Whereas Singer is primarily concerned with improving the handling of animals and accepts that, in some hypothetical scenarios, individual animals might be used legitimately to farther human or nonhuman ends, Regan believes we ought to care for nonhuman animals equally we would humans. He applies the strict Kantian ideal (which Kant himself applied only to humans) that they ought never to exist sacrificed equally a means to an end, and must be treated as ends in themselves.^[37]

Abolitionism [edit]

Gary Francione: animals demand only the right not to exist regarded every bit holding.

Gary Francione, professor of law and philosophy at Rutgers Police force School in Newark, is a leading abolitionist writer, arguing that animals demand simply ane correct, the correct not to be owned. Everything else would follow from that epitome shift. He writes that, although most people would condemn the mistreatment of animals, and in many countries in that location are laws that seem to reflect those concerns, "in practice the legal system allows any use of animals, however abhorrent." The law just requires that any suffering non be "unnecessary". In deciding what counts as "unnecessary", an animal'south interests are weighed against the interests of homo beings, and the latter almost always prevail.^[38]

Francione'due south Animals, Property, and the Constabulary (1995) was the first extensive jurisprudential treatment of creature rights. In it, Francione compares the state of affairs of animals to the treatment of slaves in the Us, where legislation existed that appeared to protect them while the courts ignored that the institution of slavery itself rendered the protection unenforceable.^[39] He offers as an example the U.s. Beast Welfare Act, which he describes equally an instance of symbolic legislation, intended to assuage public business concern about the handling of animals, just difficult to implement.^[twoscore]

He argues that a focus on animal welfare, rather than animal rights, may worsen the position of animals past making the public experience comfortable about using them and entrenching the view of them as holding. He calls animal rights groups who pursue animate being welfare bug, such as People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, the "new welfarists", arguing that they have more than in common with 19th-century beast protectionists than with the animal rights movement; indeed, the terms "creature protection" and "protectionism" are increasingly favored. His position in 1996 was that there is no animal rights movement in the United States.^[41]

Contractarianism [edit]

Mark Rowlands, professor of philosophy at the University of Florida, has proposed a contractarian approach, based on the original position and the veil of ignorance—a "state of nature" idea experiment that tests intuitions virtually justice and fairness—in John Rawls'due south A Theory of Justice (1971). In the original position, individuals choose principles of justice (what kind of society to form, and how primary social goods will be distributed), unaware of their individual characteristics—their race, sex, class, or intelligence, whether they are athletic or disabled, rich or poor—and therefore unaware of which role they will assume in the lodge they are about to form.^[27]

The idea is that, operating backside the veil of ignorance, they will choose a social contract in which there is basic fairness and justice for them no thing the position they occupy. Rawls did not include species membership every bit one of the attributes hidden from the determination-makers in the original position. Rowlands proposes extending the veil of ignorance to include rationality, which he argues is an undeserved property like to characteristics including race, sex activity and intelligence.^[27]

Prima facie rights theory [edit]

American philosopher Timothy Garry has proposed an approach that deems nonhuman animals worthy of prima facie rights. In a philosophical context, a prima facie (Latin for "on the face of information technology" or "at showtime glance") right is one that appears to be applicable at showtime glance, just upon closer examination may exist outweighed by other considerations. In his book Ideals: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory, Lawrence Hinman characterizes such rights as "the correct is real but leaves open up the question of whether it is applicable and overriding in a particular state of affairs".^[42] The thought that nonhuman animals are worthy of prima facie rights is to say that, in a sense, animals have rights that tin can be overridden by many other considerations, especially those conflicting a human's right to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness. Garry supports his view arguing:

... if a nonhuman animal were to kill a human being in the U.S., information technology would have broken the laws of the country and would probably get rougher sanctions than if it were a human. My point is that like laws govern all who collaborate within a club, rights are to be practical to all beings who collaborate within that society. This is not to say these rights endowed by humans are equivalent to those held by nonhuman animals, simply rather that if humans possess rights and so and then must all those who interact with humans.^[43]

In sum, Garry suggests that humans have obligations to nonhuman animals; animals do not, and ought non to, have uninfringible rights against humans.

Feminism and animal rights [edit]

The American ecofeminist Ballad Adams has written extensively about the link between feminism and animal rights, starting with The Sexual Politics of Meat (1990).

Women accept played a central office in animal advocacy since the 19th century.^[44] The anti-vivisection movement in the 19th and early 20th century in England and the United States was largely run by women, including Frances Power Cobbe, Anna Kingsford, Lizzy Lind af Hageby and Caroline Earle White (1833–1916).^[45] Garner writes that 70 per cent of the membership of the Victoria Street Society (1 of the anti-vivisection groups founded by Cobbe) were women, as were lxx per cent of the membership of the British RSPCA in 1900.^[46]

The modern animate being advocacy movement has a like representation of women. They are not invariably in leadership positions: during the March for Animals in Washington, D.C., in 1990—the largest fauna rights demonstration held until then in the The states—nearly of the participants were women, merely near of the platform speakers were men.^[47] Nevertheless, several influential animal advancement groups have been founded by women, including the British Spousal relationship for the Abolition of Vivisection by Cobbe in London in 1898; the Animate being Welfare Board of India past Rukmini Devi Arundale in 1962; and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, co-founded by Ingrid Newkirk in 1980. In the Netherlands, Marianne Thieme and Esther Ouwehand were elected to parliament in 2006 representing the Parliamentary group for Animals.

The preponderance of women in the movement has led to a body of academic literature exploring feminism and animal rights; feminism and vegetarianism or veganism, the oppression of women and animals, and the male association of women and animals with nature and emotion, rather than reason—an clan that several feminist writers take embraced.^[44] Lori Gruen writes that women and animals serve the aforementioned symbolic function in a patriarchal society: both are "the used"; the dominated, submissive "Other".^[48] When the British feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759–1797) published A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), Thomas Taylor (1758–1835), a Cambridge philosopher, responded with an anonymous parody, A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes (1792), saying that Wollstonecraft's arguments for women's rights could be applied equally to animals, a position he intended equally reductio ad absurdum.^[49]

Transhumanism [edit]

Some transhumanists contend for animate being rights, liberation, and "uplift" of creature consciousness into machines.^[50] Transhumanism too understands brute rights on a gradation or spectrum with other types of sentient rights, including human rights and the rights of conscious bogus intelligences (posthuman rights).^[51]

Critics [edit]

R. G. Frey [edit]

R. G. Frey, professor of philosophy at Bowling Dark-green State University, is a preference commonsensical, equally is Vocaliser. But, in his early work, Interests and Rights (1980), Frey disagreed with Vocalizer – who in his Animal Liberation (1975) wrote that the interests of nonhuman animals must be included when judging the consequences of an deed – on the grounds that animals have no interests. Frey argues that interests are dependent on desire, and that no want tin be without a corresponding belief. Animals have no beliefs, because a belief state requires the power to hold a second-guild belief—a belief about the belief—which he argues requires language: "If someone were to say, e.g. 'The true cat believes that the door is locked,' and so that person is holding, equally I encounter it, that the cat holds the declarative sentence 'The door is locked' to be true; and I can meet no reason whatever for crediting the cat or whatever other animal which lacks language, including human infants, with entertaining declarative sentences."^[52]

Carl Cohen [edit]

Carl Cohen, professor of philosophy at the Academy of Michigan, argues that rights holders must exist able to distinguish between their ain interests and what is correct. "The holders of rights must have the capacity to cover rules of duty governing all, including themselves. In applying such rules, [they] ... must recognize possible conflicts between what is in their own involvement and what is just. Only in a community of beings capable of cocky-restricting moral judgments can the concept of a right be correctly invoked." Cohen rejects Singer'due south statement that, since a brain-damaged human being could non make moral judgments, moral judgments cannot be used as the distinguishing feature for determining who is awarded rights. Cohen writes that the test for moral judgment "is non a examination to exist administered to humans ane by 1", merely should be applied to the chapters of members of the species in general.^[53]

Richard Posner [edit]

Judge Richard Posner of the United states of america Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit debated the upshot of animal rights in 2001 with Peter Vocalist.^[55] Posner posits that his moral intuition tells him "that human beings prefer their ain. If a domestic dog threatens a human infant, fifty-fifty if it requires causing more than pain to the domestic dog to finish it, than the dog would have caused to the infant, then we favour the child. It would be monstrous to spare the domestic dog."^[54]

Singer challenges this by arguing that formerly diff rights for gays, women, and certain races were justified using the same ready of intuitions. Posner replies that equality in ceremonious rights did non occur considering of upstanding arguments, only because facts mounted that there were no morally significant differences between humans based on race, sex activity, or sexual orientation that would support inequality. If and when similar facts emerge virtually humans and animals, the differences in rights volition erode too. But facts will drive equality, not upstanding arguments that run opposite to instinct, he argues. Posner calls his arroyo "soft utilitarianism", in dissimilarity to Singer'south "hard utilitarianism". He argues:

The "soft" utilitarian position on creature rights is a moral intuition of many, probably most, Americans. Nosotros realize that animals feel hurting, and we think that to inflict pain without a reason is bad. Nothing of applied value is added by dressing up this intuition in the linguistic communication of philosophy; much is lost when the intuition is made a stage in a logical statement. When kindness toward animals is levered into a duty of weighting the pains of animals and of people equally, bizarre vistas of social engineering are opened upward.^[54]

Roger Scruton [edit]

Roger Scruton, the British philosopher, argued that rights imply obligations. Every legal privilege, he wrote, imposes a burden on the one who does non possess that privilege: that is, "your right may be my duty." Scruton therefore regarded the emergence of the fauna rights motility equally "the strangest cultural shift inside the liberal worldview", because the idea of rights and responsibilities is, he argued, distinctive to the human being condition, and it makes no sense to spread them beyond our own species.^[12]

He accused animal rights advocates of "pre-scientific" anthropomorphism, attributing traits to animals that are, he says, Beatrix Potter-like, where "merely man is vile." It is within this fiction that the appeal of beast rights lies, he argued. The world of animals is non-judgmental, filled with dogs who return our affection almost no matter what we do to them, and cats who pretend to be affectionate when, in fact, they care only about themselves. Information technology is, he argued, a fantasy, a earth of escape.^[12]

Scruton singled out Peter Vocaliser, a prominent Australian philosopher and animal-rights activist, for criticism. He wrote that Singer'due south works, including Animal Liberation, "contain little or no philosophical argument. They derive their radical moral conclusions from a vacuous utilitarianism that counts the pain and pleasance of all living things equally equally significant and that ignores just about everything that has been said in our philosophical tradition about the real distinction betwixt persons and animals."^[12]

Tom Regan countered this view of rights by distinguishing moral agents and moral patients.^[56] ^{[ unreliable source? ]}

Public attitudes [edit]

According to a newspaper published in 2000 by Harold Herzog and Lorna Dorr, previous bookish surveys of attitudes towards animal rights have tended to suffer from small sample sizes and non-representative groups.^[57] However, a number of factors announced to correlate with the mental attitude of individuals regarding the treatment of animals and creature rights. These include gender, age, occupation, religion, and level of education. There has also been evidence to suggest that prior experience with pets may be a gene in people's attitudes.^[58]

Women are more likely to empathize with the cause of animate being rights than men.^[58] ^[59] A 1996 report suggested that factors that may partially explain this discrepancy include attitudes towards feminism and science, scientific literacy, and the presence of a greater emphasis on "nurturance or compassion" among women.^[threescore]

A common misconception on the concept of animal rights is that its proponents desire to grant non-homo animals the exact same legal rights equally humans, such as the right to vote. This is not the case, every bit the concept is that animals should have rights with equal consideration to their interests (for case, cats do non have any involvement in voting, so they should non take the right to vote).^[61] A 2016 study constitute that support for beast testing may not be based on cogent philosophical rationales, and more than open debate is warranted.^[62]

A 2007 survey to examine whether or non people who believed in development were more probable to support animal rights than creationists and believers in intelligent pattern establish that this was largely the case – according to the researchers, the respondents who were strong Christian fundamentalists and believers in creationism were less probable to advocate for animal rights than those who were less fundamentalist in their beliefs. The findings extended previous inquiry, such as a 1992 written report which found that 48% of fauna rights activists were atheists or agnostic.^[63] ^[64] A 2019 study in The Washington Mail service found that those who accept positive attitudes toward animal rights besides tend to have a positive view of universal healthcare, favor reducing bigotry against African Americans, the LGBT community and undocumented immigrants, and expanding welfare to aid the poor.^[65]

2 surveys found that attitudes towards fauna rights tactics, such every bit direct action, are very diverse within the creature rights communities. About one-half (50% and 39% in ii surveys) of activists do not support direct action. I survey concluded "it would be a error to portray animal rights activists as homogeneous."^[58] ^[66]

Raising sensation through pop communication mediums is another approach socially responsible professionals have taken up. Film maker Salil Fernandes and advertisement professional Vandana Sethhi joined hands to create a documentary on stray animals titled The Tails of Boo Boo and Cuddly Poo. ^[67] ^[68]

Meet also [edit]

Animals portal
Animal cognition
Beast consciousness
Animal–industrial complex
Animal liberation
Animal liberation motility
Animal liberationist
Animal rights by state or territory
Animal studies
Fauna trial
Animal Welfare Institute
Antinaturalism (politics)
Cambridge Announcement on Consciousness
Chick culling
Critical brute studies
Deep ecology
Practise Animals Have Rights? (book)
List of creature rights advocates
Listing of songs about beast rights
Open rescue
Constitute rights
Sentientism
Timeline of animal welfare and rights
Wild animal suffering
World Animal Solar day

References [edit]

^ Kumar, Satish (September 2002). You are, therefore I am: A declaration of dependence. ISBN9781903998182.
^ DeGrazia (2002), ch. 2; Taylor (2009), ch. 1.
^ Taylor (2009), ch. iii.
^ Compare for example similar usage of the term in 1938: The American Biological science Instructor. Vol. 53. National Association of Biology Teachers. 1938. p. 211. Retrieved 16 April 2021. The foundation from which these behaviors spring is the ideology known as speciesism. Speciesism is securely rooted in the widely-held belief that the human species is entitled to certain rights and privileges.
^ Horta (2010).
^
That a cardinal goal of animal rights is to eliminate the holding status of animals, run into Sunstein (2004), p. 11ff.
- For speciesism and fundamental protections, see Waldau (2011).
- For food, clothing, research subjects or entertainment, encounter Francione (1995), p. 17.
^ "Animal Law Courses". Animal Legal Defense Fund.
^
For fauna-law courses in North America, encounter "Fauna constabulary courses" Archived 2010-06-xiii at the Wayback Machine, Fauna Legal Defense force Fund. Retrieved July 12, 2012.
- For a word of animals and personhood, run into Wise (2000), pp. four, 59, 248ff; Wise (2004); Posner (2004); Wise (2007).
- For the arguments and counter-arguments virtually awarding personhood simply to not bad apes, see Garner (2005), p. 22.
- As well see Sunstein, Cass R. (February 20, 2000). "The Chimps' Day in Courtroom", The New York Times.
^ Giménez, Emiliano (January 4, 2015). "Argentine orangutan granted unprecedented legal rights". edition.cnn.com. CNN Espanol. Retrieved April 21, 2015.
^ Cohen, Carl; Regan, Tom (2001). The Animal Rights Debate. Point/Counterpoint: Philosophers Debate Contemporary Issues Series. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. p. 47. ISBN9780847696628 . Retrieved sixteen April 2021. Also often overlooked in the beast world, co-ordinate to Sapontzis, are insects that take interests, and therefore rights.
^ The concept of "bacteria rights" can appear coupled with disdain or irony: Pluhar, Evelyn B. (1995). "Human "superiority" and the argument from marginal cases". Across Prejudice: The Moral Significance of Human and Nonhuman Animals. Book collections on Project MUSE. Durham, Due north Carolina: Duke University Press. p. 9. ISBN9780822316480 . Retrieved 16 April 2021. For example, in an editorial entitled 'Animal Rights Nonsense,' ... in the prestigious science periodical Nature, defenders of animal rights are accused of being committed to the applesauce of 'bacteria rights.'
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Scruton, Roger (Summer 2000). "Beast Rights". City Journal. New York: Manhattan Institute for Policy Research.
^ Liguori, Yard.; et al. (2017). "Ethical Issues in the Use of Animal Models for Tissue Engineering: Reflections on Legal Aspects, Moral Theory, 3Rs Strategies, and Harm-Benefit Analysis" (PDF). Tissue Engineering science Role C: Methods. 23 (12): 850–862. doi:10.1089/10.TEC.2017.0189. PMID 28756735.
^
Garner (2005), pp. 11, 16.
- Also see Frey (1980); and for a review of Frey, see Sprigge (1981).
^ Singer (2000), pp. 151–156.
^ Martin, Gus (xv June 2011). The SAGE Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition. SAGE. ISBN9781412980166 – via Google Books.
^ Garner (2005), pp. 21–22.
^ ^a ^b Grant, Catharine (2006). The No-nonsense Guide to Fauna Rights . New Internationalist. p. 24. ISBN9781904456407. These religions emphasize ahimsa, which is the principle of not-violence towards all living things. The first precept is a prohibition against the killing of any beast. The Jain, Hindu and Buddhist injunctions against killing serve to teach that all creatures are spiritually equal.
^ "BBC - Religions - Islam: Animals". bbc.co.great britain.
^ Proverbs xxx:24 and NW; Psalm 104:24, 25, 27, 28
^ Ps 147:9
^ Craig (1988).
^ Nussbaum (2006), pp. 388ff, 393ff; also run into Nussbaum (2004), p. 299ff.
^ Weir (2009): see Clark (1977); Rollin (1981); Midgley (1984).
^ Vallentyne (2005); Vallentyne (2007).
^ Rowlands (2009), p. 98ff; Hursthouse (2000a); Hursthouse (2000b), p. 146ff.
^ ^a ^b ^c Rowlands (1998), p. 118ff, particularly pp. 147–152.
^ Nussbaum (2004), p. 302.
^ For a discussion of preference utilitarianism, see Vocaliser (2011), pp. 14ff, 94ff.
^ Vocalizer (1990), pp. vii–8.
^ Vocalist 1990, p. 5.
^ Singer (1990), p. 4.
^ Rollin (1989), pp. xii, pp. 117–118; Rollin (2007).
^ Vocalist (1990), pp. 10–17, citing Stamp Dawkins (1980), Walker (1983), and Griffin (1984); Garner (2005), pp. 13–14.
^ Singer (1990) p. 12ff.
^ ^a ^b ^c ^d Regan (1983), p. 243.
^ Regan (1983).
^ Francione (1990), pp. four, 17ff.
^ Francione (1995), pp. 4–5.
^ Francione (1995), p. 208ff.
^
Francione (1996), p. 32ff
- Francione and Garner (2010), pp. 1ff, 175ff.
- Hall, Lee. "An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione" Archived May 8, 2009, at the Wayback Auto, Friends of Animals. Retrieved February iii, 2011.
^ Hinman, Lawrence M. Ethics: A Pluralistic Approach to Moral Theory. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace College, 1998. Impress.
^ Garry, Timothy J. Nonhuman Animals: Possessors of Prima Facie Rights (2012), p.6
^ ^a ^b Lansbury (1985); Adams (1990); Donovan (1993); Gruen (1993); Adams (1994); Adams and Donovan (1995); Adams (2004); MacKinnon (2004).
^ Kean (1995).
^ Garner (2005), p. 141, citing Elston (1990), p. 276.
^ Garner (2005), pp. 142–143.
^ Gruen (1993), p. 60ff.
^ Vocaliser (1990), p. one.
^ George Dvorsky. "The Ethics of Animal Enhancement".
^ Evans, Woody (2015). "Posthuman Rights: Dimensions of Transhuman Worlds". Teknokultura. 12 (2). doi:10.5209/rev_TK.2015.v12.n2.49072.
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^ ^a ^b ^c
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^ Vocalizer (June fifteen, 2001).
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